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Abstract 
 
Speeding is one of the main contributing factors to road crashes. The use of Automated Speed 
Enforcement programmes (ASE) appears to be one of the most promising interventions to 
change driver behaviour and reduce road trauma. International experience has shown clear 
benefits from such programmes. The French government implemented ASE in late 2003. 
Currently, 2000 radar devices are deployed throughout the French territory, with an emphasis 
on fixed cameras. The Australian state of Queensland implemented ASE in May 1997 with 
500 initial camera sites. The number of sites and operational camera hours has increased since 
the programme’s inception and recently, fixed speed cameras were introduced. This paper 
compares the approaches taken by the French and Queensland Governments regarding 
implementation and management of ASE. The first section summarises the historical 
background of both programmes and highlights the role of political leaders in the road safety 
arena. The second section addresses organisational dimensions, including how the 
programmes are deployed and operated. Finally, we compare the performance outcomes of 
each system. We conclude by highlighting that there appears to be no single best way to 
implement speed enforcement measures in a ‘whole-of-jurisdiction’ approach. Rather, lessons 
from the deployment of individual enforcement methods and related outcomes internationally, 
together with considerations of political and organizational factors, should inform speed 
management strategy choices. 
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Introduction 
 
Speeding is one of the major contributing factors to road crashes and a large body of 
international literature acknowledges the risks associated with increased driving speeds 
(GRSP, 2008). Camera-based speed enforcement has been shown to be a very effective 
intervention to reduce crashes and associated trauma in many jurisdictions around the world 
(Cameron, 2008). However this type of traffic law enforcement is also a sensitive topic 
because of its potential to directly impact on road users in the form of high monetary fines, 
loss of demerit points and the potential for eventual licence and/or vehicle loss. Moreover, 
public sensitivity surrounding ASE programmes can relate to public concerns about the 
motivations of authorities (i.e., perceptions of ASE being motivated by revenue raising for 
governments, rather than by safety concerns for the general driving public). It can also relate 
to concerns about the technologies used and the way in which they are implemented, 
operated, and maintained. For a more in-depth discussion of issues relating to the four main 
dilemmas associated with speed enforcement programmes as identified by Goldenbeld (2002) 
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(social, legitimacy, implementation and credibility dilemmas), see Delaney, Ward, & 
Cameron, 2005. 
 
Most of the existing research on speed camera programmes has, justifiably, focused on their 
effectiveness in reducing crashes (fatal, injury, and total) and travel speeds. Around the world, 
there is a great deal of variety in the type of equipment (e.g., mobile/fixed cameras) and the 
deployment mechanisms used (e.g., overt/covert operations). The research findings suggest 
that there is no one single best way to design such a programme. Despite the fact that different 
countries have developed different policies and technical approaches to implementing speed 
camera programmes, there has been limited systemic research investigating the policy aspects 
of camera-based enforcement. Traffic law enforcement is a complex social action involving 
many players including government agencies, elected political representatives, the judiciary, 
researchers, industries, the community, and individuals. It involves a particular system of 
governance, which, we believe, warrants detailed analysis. This paper takes the first step by 
offering points of analysis in two quite distinct operational ASE programmes. 
 
Queensland and France are different in many dimensions. In terms of geography, Queensland 
covers 1,852,642 km², making it 3 times larger than France (674,843 km²). In 2007, France’s 
population was roughly 64 million, more than 15 times greater than the population of 
Queensland (4 million). The political organizations are also different in many regards. 
Queensland is one of Australia’s most decentralized states and belongs to the Commonwealth 
of Australia. Each Commonwealth state has its own legislature. France is part of the European 
Union, but keeps an important autonomy. Moreover, its administrative organization shows a 
strong influence of central government. Concerning the traffic safety situation, in 2006, the 
fatality rate per 100,000 km traveled in Australia and France was the same, 7.7. However 
Queensland’s fatality rate was higher at 8.29. This information provides an initial snapshot of 
the current situation in both countries. To expand upon this, our paper focuses on the policy 
aspects of speed camera deployment and contrasts the approaches taken by France and 
Queensland. The first section of the paper provides an historical overview of speed camera 
programme development and identifies the role that political intervention has played in 
implementation. The second section details deployment characteristics of the two 
programmes. The last section discusses the outcomes obtained by each system.  
 
Speed camera policy frameworks 
 
The deployment of an effective speed enforcement programme requires involvement of all 
road safety stakeholders. The implementation of a speed enforcement programme is an 
important decision for a government. It represents a major change for road safety public 
policy. There are different objectives and approaches for installing speed cameras, illustrating 
different political considerations and operational strategies. 
 
The French strategy: political priority and breaking with past practices 
In July 2002, France's president Jacques Chirac decided to make road safety a priority for his 
term in office (Carnis, 2007). This political commitment from the top executive level was the 
main catalyst for initiating an important change in the public policy of road safety. The 
support of the President has undoubtedly contributed to the success of the policy change in 
terms of effectiveness (it has operated since 2003) and outcomes (high reductions of fatalities 
and injuries). The political impulse was a determining factor for having a good understanding 
of the implementation process. Road safety issues were put at the forefront of the political 
agenda. Moreover, it was supported by previous legal decisions and technical investigations 
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that made it possible to rapidly establish a system of Automated Control (CA) (Carte Blanche 
Conseil, 2003). This work was done at the interministerial level, which requires considerable 
efforts to coordinate the interventions of the different Departments involved in this policy 
(e.g., Justice, Interior, Transport). 
 
The introduction of CA can also be interpreted as a reaction to past practices of deterrence in 
general, and speed enforcement in particular. Indeed the public policy of deterrence, as it was 
implemented, was a highly ineffective one. For instance, before the introduction of the CA, the 
likelihood of detection was very low (0.33 infringements per hour of surveillance in 1998) 
(Carnis, 2001). Furthermore, issues of enforcement tolerances and leniency were evident and 
served to undermine the deterrence principles of certainty and severity of punishments. For 
example, the exercise of tolerance (a detection threshold of 30 km/h over the speed limit was 
applied1) (Carnis, 2001) and leniency (e.g., prosecutions abandoned) were widespread 
(Zauberman, 1999; Pérez-Diaz, 1998). The use of these practises was well known and seemed 
ultimately to be accepted unreservedly by all (politicians, public decision makers and the 
driving public). In fact, these behaviours, perceived as ‘humane practice’ by police officers, 
constituted important means for managing their police interactions with road users (who are 
also citizens and voters). Indeed for some officers, their work (traffic policing) was conducted 
in the very jurisdictions in which they lived (Carnis, 2007). Moreover, the recovery rate for 
fines was low, with an average of 2 offenders out of 3 avoiding payment (Carnis, 2001) and 
some offences not leading to prosecution. Together, this emphasizes the low priority given to 
Highway Code offences by the judicial process at the time.2  Thus, a speeding offender 
benefited from impunity and, if caught, the probability of punishment was very low. 
Therefore, the French CA can be viewed as an essential departure from past practices and as 
an important executive decision to introduce a modern, effective and fairer enforcement 
system. When the programme was first introduced, emphasis was given to the fairness of the 
system. This is likely to account for the high level of social acceptance that the program now 
experiences (Ragot, 2006). 
 
The implementation of CA began with an experimental phase in the beginning of 2003. Six 
different sites were chosen where automatic radar devices would operate. The results, in terms 
of reduction of speed and number of speed offenders, encouraged further developments of CA 
(Carnis, 2008). In November 2003, 80 first-generation radars were deployed. From 2004 to 
2007, the number of devices increased, and 2000 operating radar devices were planned for the 
end of the period. During this time, more than 1800 radars are operational to fulfil the 
objective of covering the whole national territory. The authorities also decided to enlarge the 
scope of the system3. When the CA was launched, only speeding offences were targeted. In 
2006, the introduction of red light cameras and some devices to enforce the inter-distance 
between the vehicles to avoid tailgating accidents was planned. In the near future, the system 
will manage the automation of illegal parking enforcement. In February 2008, Prime Minister 
Fillon announced the instalment of 500 additional radar devices each year over the 2008-2012 
period. This will result in 2500 new radar devices and represents a total of 4500 operational 
                                                 
1 For example, 80 km/h in a 50 km/h urban zone: a margin of tolerance of 40%! Such practices were noted 
during field investigations. 
2 We wish thank T. Godefroy who provided the figures enabling us to determine this rate. 
3 See « 3 questions à Jean-Jacques Debacq, Préfet directeur du projet interministériel Contrôle automatisé », 
www.securite-routiere.gouv.fr/data/revue152/onenparle 
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units. It was decided also to toughen the punishment associated with repeat offences4 and to 
aim for less than the 3000 fatalities for 2012 across the jurisdiction5. 
 
The Queensland strategy: initial successes, and the role of political intervention 
The strategic framework for road safety strategies is based on the National Road Safety 
Strategy (2001-2010) and the Queensland Road Safety Strategy (2004-2011). There are a 
number of key players in the road safety arena in Queensland. The Queensland Police Service 
(QPS), Queensland Transport (QT) and the Department of Main Roads are lead agencies and 
play a major role in implementing the Queensland Road Safety Strategy. Additionally, the 
Queensland Parliament created a Parliamentary Travelsafe committee in 1990. This body 
consists of elected Members of Parliament, reports directly to Parliament, and is responsible 
for monitoring and investigating all aspects of road safety and public transport issues across 
the entire state of Queensland.  
 
A speed management strategy was initiated in 1993 with the release of a Speed Management 
Issues Paper (Queensland Transport, 1993). Speed camera legislation was ratified by the 
Queensland parliament in 1996 and implemented in May 1997 with the deployment of 
cameras at 500 sites6. These sites were located only on roads controlled by the State, at 
locations with a prior crash history and on roads where a speed limit review had been 
completed (Newstead & Cameron, 2003). In December 1991, prior to the introduction of 
speed cameras in Queensland, a Police enforcement programme called Random Road Watch 
(RRW) was initiated. The important features of this initiative were the manner in which 
police resources were randomly allocated to attain maximum road safety benefits, and the 
large proportion of the road network that was included. In particular, the random allocation of 
resources across the system aimed to reduce the ability of motorists to predict or anticipate the 
timing and location of enforcement activities (Newstead, Cameron, & Leggett, 1999; Watson, 
Fraine, & Mitchell, 1994). Random allocation also became an important feature for 
deployment when the speed camera programme was eventually introduced in 1997 (Cameron 
& Delaney, 2006).  
 
During the 1990’s, the road fatality rate fell by 40% from a rate of 13.73 fatalities per 100,000 
people in 1992, to a rate of 8.19 in 2003 in Queensland. Unfortunately however, that decrease 
did not continue in the period beyond 2003. One reason that is signaled as contributing to this 
is the state’s high level of economic growth. From 2001-2005, Queensland experienced the 
fastest population growth in Australia, as well as the largest increase in vehicle registrations 
and in the vehicle kilometres traveled (Queensland Transport, 2008). In 2005, the fatality rate 
had increased to 8.27 per 100,000. This represented an increase of 5.6% on the previous year 
(Queensland Transport, 2006). Additionally, the period at the end of 2005 was to prove a 
critical time for the speed management strategy (and road safety more generally) in 
Queensland. The summer holiday period coincides with Christmas/New Year in Australia. 
Traditionally, this period sees large increases in the amount of private travel and in distances 
traveled on the road. It is also associated with escalated police enforcement activity and 
intense media and public attention on safe driving practices and road crashes7. A three-fold 
                                                 
4 Henceforth, the vehicle can be confiscated for repeat offences  
5 See especially Comité interministériel de la sécurité routière (13 February 2008), accessed 18/02/08,  
www.securite-routiere.gouv.fr/vos-infos/presse. 
6 This was approximately a decade after the first use of speed cameras in another Australian state, Victoria. 
7 Interestingly, studies conducted on holiday periods in Australia indicate that road fatalities during these times 
are influenced by random, rather than systematic events, and further, that fatality rates are not any lower or 
higher than other times of the year when average number of deaths per day are considered (ATSB, 2006).  
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increase in fatalities during the 2005/2006 Christmas holiday period in Queensland was the 
catalyst for political intervention.  
 
In February 2006, the then Premier of Queensland, Peter Beattie, called a Road Safety 
Summit in response to the events that had taken place on the state’s roads during the 
preceding holiday period: ‘The reason that the state government called this summit was the 
increased road toll over Christmas’ (Queensland Parliament, 2006, pg 1). The Summit heard 
presentations from some of Australia’s leading road safety research experts and community 
members on a variety of countermeasures and ideas. The Premier and the two senior 
Ministers responsible for road safety in Queensland (i.e., Transport and Police Ministers) 
attended the Summit and promised to consider all suggestions arising from the proceedings. 
During his opening address, the Premier discussed the option of considering an increase in the 
use warning signage for speed cameras so as to ‘ensure very conspicuous coverage of the road 
network (Queensland Parliament, 2006, p.2). Additionally, he flagged the need to consider 
introducing permanent, fixed speed cameras, noting that this suggestion would be unpalatable 
to some. In late 2007, three fixed speed cameras were introduced in Queensland as one of the 
outcomes of the 2006 Road Safety Summit (QPS, 2008a). In many respects, this is very 
similar to the French context. Strong political will, as well as complex coordination at high 
level of the state government was required.  
 
Policy Comparison 
A comparison of ASE in Queensland and France highlights some important points. The size 
of each country, and the number of total fatalities are not comparable. However, there is a 
strong convergence between the two jurisdictions. Firstly, ASE devices appear as an obvious 
solution for both public authorities to fight successfully against illegal speed. It represents a 
modern intervention tool to obtain a substantial decrease in road crashes. Secondly, political 
commitment was an important and necessary dimension associated with implementing and/or 
expanding these programmes. Such programmes are not popular with all sectors of the driving 
public and need a great deal of political support to be implemented. In fact, it has been 
suggested that authorities (i.e., government and police) should give careful consideration to 
managing the risks associated with the social controversy surrounding the introduction or 
expansion of speed enforcement programmes (Cameron, 2008). President Chirac’s support, 
and the Premier of Queensland’s commitment are good illustrations of the political dimension 
associated with the decision to implement or enhance ASE programmes. Thirdly, the 
successful implementation of an ASE programme requires coordination among different 
public bodies. This emphasizes the institutional dimension, which constitutes an important 
component in operationalizing an automated enforcement system. Obviously there are also 
key differences in the two programmes. Queensland implemented an ASE programme earlier 
than France and proceeded in a different manner. In France, fixed speed cameras were 
introduced first and are the key priority in the French strategy. In Queensland, mobile radar 
devices were operated initially, with a limited number of fixed cameras introduced only 
recently.  
 
How these programmes operate 
 
The automation of speed enforcement involves a variety of technological choices regarding 
the specific type of camera and ‘back office’ processing equipment to be used. Similarly, 
choices must also be made about specific deployment strategies (e.g., covert/overt), based on 
the potential benefits associated with each. Discussion will now turn to the operation of the 
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French and Queensland programmes because each can demonstrate different aspects of the 
organizational dimension associated with ASE. 
 
The French CA: an automated system with an original enforcement strategy 
The French CA is based on a quasi-automation of the process, from detection through to 
sanction. When the driver commits a speeding offence, the vehicle license number and speed 
are recorded. This information is transmitted to the National Processing Centre (CNT – 
Centre National de Traitement) in Rennes, which identifies the offender and issues an 
infringement notice. The use of automated devices makes it possible to centralize the working 
for the operational dimension. All speed offences detected by an automated device are treated 
by the CNT according to a unique process and offences are processed quickly, usually within 
7 days (Carnis, 2007). Without describing the details of the treatment process8, it is important 
to note that the offender can be detected and punished without human involvement. This 
constituted a huge innovation for the public enforcement policy. Indeed it constitutes an 
important step towards the dematerialization of the judicial process, where greater 
efficiencies in enforcement resources are achieved through the use of automation. 
 
CA's management system is run by the DPICA (Interministerial Automated Speed Detection 
Project), which handles strategy and decision-making – location, studies, legal and 
administrative aspects. It is placed under the authority of a Préfet (a high level representative 
of the State) and associated members of police forces and civil workers from the Department 
of Transportation. The management system is also marked by centralized control and 
constitutes an original organization for the road safety enforcement field in France. Indeed its 
jurisdiction covers the whole territory and can manage its intervention with relative 
independence from the other enforcement organizations. The programme is self-funded; the 
revenue generated by the programme is used to fund the instalment of new devices. In 2007, 
the revenue amounted to 454 million Euros. The cost of the programme was roughly 117 
million Euros. Surplus funds are reserved for funding the maintenance and development of 
the road network, and for developing different means of land transportation. There are also 
some financial transfers to the regional areas throughout France. 
 
The automated detection system is composed of two distinct and complementary branches. 
While the fixed speed cameras in France are totally automatic and function fulltime, the 
mobile versions function discontinuously. The operation of the latter requires intervention by 
the police organisation: the Gendarmerie Nationale in country and semi-urban areas, and the 
Police Nationale in cities. The decision was made by authorities to utilize a ratio of 2/3 fixed 
devices and 1/3 mobile devices. The fixed speed cameras are operated overtly and 
conspicuously signed. Thus, they are used to promote general deterrence. The objective is to 
modify drivers’ speed preferences and to make people more aware of their likelihood of 
apprehension if exceeding the speed limit. The mobile speed cameras are used to promote 
specific deterrence because they are routinely operated in unmarked vehicles and without 
signage. Both types of devices complement the more traditional speeding detection methods 
(e.g., laser binoculars and handheld radars), which together, form a balanced strategy aimed at 
deterring all forms of speeding offenders on a range of road environments (Corbett and 
Simons 1999; Cameron et al. 2003). 
 
                                                 
8 See Carnis (2007) for a complete presentation of the operation of the system. 
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The Queensland system: mobile and overt with revenue used for safety initiatives 
The Queensland Police Service (QPS) is the agency with the primary responsibility for 
delivering traffic law enforcement activities across the entire state. Prior to the introduction of 
the ASE program in 1997, a review of speed limits on state-controlled roads was undertaken. 
This resulted in approximately 5% of the 33,000 kilometres of road undergoing a change in 
the posted speed limit. In the six months prior to the introduction of the ASE programme, a 
media education campaign was conducted to inform the public about the new enforcement 
method. A six-week amnesty period was observed prior to the official start date (1st May). 
During this time, those detected by the cameras were warned about their offence but were not 
fined (Newstead & Cameron, 2003). This approach aimed to increase public awareness about 
the introduction of the new devices. As already indicated, the operation of the ASE in 
Queensland is based on the general deterrence philosophy, as evidenced by the overt nature of 
the operations. 
 
Road signs advertise the site location where mobile speed cameras operate and clearly marked 
and highly visible police vehicles are used for speed camera operations. Camera sites require 
approval according to strict selection criteria, with crash history the primary consideration. 
Secondary criteria for site selection include areas undergoing road works (to ensure safety of 
road workers) or areas where public complaints have been documented and validated. All 
camera sites are approved by local Traffic Advisory Committees that are made up of 
representatives from QPS, Queensland Transport, Department of Main Roads, RACQ (the 
statewide motoring organisation), and local authorities (QPS, 2008b). In keeping with the 
previously established practice of random scheduling of police resources established under 
the Random Road Watch program, camera deployment locations are generated daily using a 
computerized scheduling process (Newstead & Cameron, 2003). This is a key component of 
the system as it operates in Queensland and is ‘designed to create the perception in the minds 
of motorists that speed cameras can be deployed anywhere, anytime.’ (QPS, 2008b). 
 
The type of mobile speed camera used is the Gatso Radar 24, which employs slant radar and 
is capable of photographing bi-directional traffic movement (i.e., vehicles moving towards or 
away from a camera) across multiple lanes of traffic. Offence processing is conducted by 
QPS’s Police Camera Traffic Office that aims to process all infringements within a three-day 
period. Infringement notices are mailed to the registered owner of the photographed vehicle 
and a 28-day period is specified for payment of the associated monetary penalty. Demerit 
points are deducted from the licence holder whose name appears on the notice if they opt to 
pay the monetary fine. The right to challenge the infringement is available to all, and this 
option does not require up-front payment of the offence penalty. The vehicle owner can 
nominate another person as the driver at the time of the offence by signing as Statutory 
Declaration. The person nominated on this form is then responsible for the offence notice. 
Non-payment of an offence can lead to the matter being referred to the State Penalties 
Enforcement Registry or to a Court for determination (QPS, 2008c). 
 
According to the relevant legislation9 all funds collected from penalties imposed for camera-
detected offences, in excess of administrative and operational costs, must be used for road 
safety education and awareness programmes, road accident injury rehabilitation programmes, 
and road funding to improve the safety of the sections of state-controlled roads where 
accidents most frequently occur. Queensland Transport and the Department of Main Roads 
administer the TORUM Act (1995) and financial accounting of speed enforcement revenue is 
                                                 
9 Transport Operations (Road Use Management) Act 1995 - TORUMS 
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monitored separately from other consolidated government funds. This is another example of a 
joint coordinated effort between government organisations. As noted above, the ASE 
programme in Queensland is largely defined by its overt nature. Three new fixed (digital) 
cameras have been trialled by QPS as result of the Road Safety Summit recommendations as 
a new programme. These digital cameras were designed to be installed at sites where mobile 
camera could not be deployed for technical or safety reasons. Fixed speed cameras are well 
signed and located at sites that have a history of road crashes, or in areas where current 
mobile speed cameras are unable to operate (QT, 2008). To the knowledge of the authors, no 
systematic evaluation has yet been carried out on the recently installed fixed cameras.  
 
Operational comparison 
The operation of both systems highlights some interesting differences. The French system 
uses digital technology. In Queensland, the current mobile devices operate with analogue 
technology (because the use of ASE commenced in Queensland earlier than in France). There 
are also differences in terms of the degree of the automation of the system. However, the 
political willingness to strengthen speed controls in Queensland and to develop a new strategy 
in the future could perhaps drive a change in the technology used. The strategy followed by 
each government is also distinct. Queensland initially implemented mobile speed enforcement 
and turned to the use of fixed controls after over a decade of operation. In France, the public 
authorities decided to develop a mixed system in which the priority was given first to fixed 
site controls. Although an intensive installment of mobile devices was used in the second 
phase of the implementation process, the authorities continue to strengthen the fixed devices, 
which constitute the core of the French CA programme. The funding schemes seem relatively 
similar across the two jurisdictions; the revenue surplus is used to fund traffic safety projects. 
However, further investigations into the exact nature of the deployment of such funds could 
be used to strengthen public belief in the value of the programmes. Finally, the management 
dimension of both programmes sees collaborative relationships between police 
organization(s) and transport authorities.  
 
Some outcomes of ASE programmes in France and Queensland 
 
Specificities of both systems can be also appraised by analyzing their outcomes. We propose 
here to investigate the impacts of an ASE by focusing on the number of infringements 
processed by the system, changes that have occurred in driving speeds, the rate of speed limit 
violations and in road crashes. 
 
The French CA: a deterrent system for speeding offenders 
There has been a seven-fold increase in the number of speeding tickets since the 
implementation of CA. Before it went into operation, the number of speeding offences was 
approximately 1.3 million annually – a figure that rose to 9.5 million in 2007. This constitutes 
a real success in identifying and punishing speed offenders. It also emphasizes the 
programmes ability to deal with huge amounts (numbers) of speeding episodes. Roughly 14.7 
million speeding cases were detected, but less than 50% yielded a speed ticket. Factors such 
as insufficient picture quality, inability of the system to issue infringement notices to foreign 
drivers contribute to this.  
 
The implementation of the automated speed detection system drove a huge increase in the 
level of detection for speed offences across the road network. At present, CA issues more than 
85% of the speed tickets. Fixed and mobile devices account for approximately 50% each of 
the output of CA, and 42.5% of total speed infringements. Moreover the number of 
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infringements detected by traditional means is stable and this method remains an essential 
component of the system of deterrence. The French experience indicates that these three types 
of speed enforcement mechanisms appear to be complementary parts of a system that defines 
an intelligent policing system. Interestingly, CA-detected infringements generally involve less 
severe violations of speed limits. Over 90% of these offences fit within the category of not 
exceeding the speed limit by more than 20 km/hour. 
 
Changes in driving speed also constitute an important outcome on which to focus analysis 
attention. CA has had a significant impact on traffic speeds10 across various road types and for 
all types of vehicle11. During 2002–2007, the average speed of private cars has fallen by 11.4 
km/hour on freeways, 11.9 km/hour on main roads, and over 15 km/hour on secondary roads. 
The overall indicator for speed per kilometre driven for the various road networks fell by 
more than 10% for the same period. Over the same period, levels of excessive speed give a 
more accurate idea of the impact of CA on traffic speeds. The level of excessive speed  (speed 
limit exceeded by up 10 km/hour) has been measured for passenger cars at 16.2% (as against 
33% in the end of 2002), 33.2% for motorcycles (as against 53.4%) and 33.1% for trucks (as 
against 19.6%)12. Moreover, it should be emphasized that major speed limit excesses (30–40 
km/hour above posted speed limits) currently represent less than one percent of total speed 
infringement notices. To sum up, these results demonstrate that a real reduction in speed has 
taken place, together with a marked drop in excessive travel speeds. This confirms the 
deterrent effect of CA. 
 
There have been few studies evaluating the impact of CA on road safety. Only the assessment 
published by the National Interministerial Road Safety Observatory (ONISR) suggests that 
CA would be responsible for 75% of the reduction obtained over the period 2002–05 (ONISR 
2006). 13  When the authorities implemented the CA in 2002, the number of road deaths was 
some 7200, the number of injuries some 138,000 and there were 116,000 accidents involving 
injury. By 2007, the official figures were expected to show a reduction in deaths to 4700. It 
appears that the operations of CA has significantly contributed to these substantial decreases. 
However at present, there is little other available information which allow for accurate levels 
of interaction between both events to be established. 
 
The Queensland programme: successful deterrence and sustained results 
Several independent reviews have been conducted on the ASE programme in Queensland, 
covering the period of implementation (1997) to June 2001, the period from July 2001 to 
December 2004, and for the calendar of 2005  (see Newstead, 2006 for a details on each of 
these). Operational hours and the number of cameras and camera sites have increased 
substantially over the life of the programme, yielding some real and sustained success across 
a number of indicators. During 2003-2006, approximately 6000 hours/month of mobile 
camera enforcement was deployed in Queensland.  
 
In terms of infringement notices issued, there appears to have been a plateau effect in 
Queensland in recent years. Annual averages show that 300,250 speeding offences per year 
                                                 
10 Speed measurements rests upon a sample of measure spots spread through the road network. Their location 
follow accurate criterion in order to produce representative information. Each spot can provide information 
relative to the mean speed, variance, 85th percentile, percentage of speed violation and distribution of driving 
speed for different categories of vehicles, and different types of road. 
11 www2.securiteroutiere.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/observatoire_vitesse.pdf 
12 Quadrimestrial values. 
13 These figures were obtained by applying Nilsson’s formula. Some work was done by focusing on the local 
effects of speed cameras. This showed an important drop in the number of fatalities and injuries. 
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were detected between 2003 and 2006, and 249,500 infringement notices were actually 
issued. Throughout the entire life of the ASE programme, the rate of prosecutions for detected 
offences has increased, and steadied at 83% during the 2003-2006 period. During the same 
time period, an average of 4.2 offences per hour were detected, and 3.5 notices per hour were 
issued (Cameron, 2008). It has been noted that during the earlier stages of the ASE 
programme, higher detection rates were recorded than is the case now. For example, compare 
the 1998 detection rate of 11.6 offences per hour with 6.4 offences per hour recorded in 2002. 
Cameron (2008) notes that offence detection rates have stabilized during the 2003-2006 
period. Queensland Transport (2008) reports that there has been a general decrease in the 
number of speed camera notices issued per vehicle. In December 2006, 1 in 206 vehicles 
travelling past a speed camera was issued a notice of speeding, as compared with 1 in every 
146 vehicles in January 2004. In relation to excessive speed offences (31 km/hour + above the 
posted speed limit), 1.4% of total offence notices were in this category in 2004 and also in 
2006. The majority of speeding offences (49.9% in 2004 and 50.3% in 2006) were in the 13-
20 km/hour offence category (QT, 2005; 2007).  
 
Crash reductions as a measure of programme success are also evident. Independent 
evaluations reveal that the initial reductions in fatal and injury crashes within 2 kms of speed 
camera zones have been sustained over time. The most recent evaluation indicates an 
estimated reduction of 34% in total crashes within this kilometre radius, and an estimated 
reduction of 42% for fatal and hospital admission crashes in the same areas (Newstead, 2006). 
These successes have been attributed to the widespread deployment of cameras across the 
network (including focused attention on crash sites) and the general deterrent effect of the 
overt nature of the operation due to the random nature of scheduling with regard to time of 
day and camera sites (Cameron, 2008). Finally, future evaluations on the recently introduced 
fixed speed cameras in Queensland will deliver information that will allow continued 
evaluation of the program overall. 
 
Outcome comparison 
Both the systems described in this paper sustain the efficiency of their respective speed 
programmes in order to deter speeding offenders. In both cases, speed limit violation rates 
have dropped significantly following the implementation of ASE. Decreasing rates of 
speeding infringements can be the result of a number of factors. It may be that increased 
levels of detection over the initial phases of the programme (specific deterrence) have been 
effective at reducing the incidence of speeding. It may also be that the clear message of 
general deterrence has been successful in changing driver behaviour. Additionally, site 
learning (familiarity with camera locations, particularly with respect to mobile deployments) 
could account for reduced speeding behaviour. However, the results seem to strongly support 
the capacity of both types of programmes to generally deter speeding offenders through their 
deployment of technological capabilities. ASE can also be combined with manual speed 
controls, as per the French experience, and, to a lesser extent, in Queensland. The exact mix 
of these various devices to promote the most efficient outcomes requires further research 
attention. 
 
The comparative rate of offence notifications issued per detections is a notable point of 
difference in the two programs. France’s rate of less than 50% is substantially lower than 
Queensland’s 83%. While acknowledging that France would deal with many more 
international drivers than would Queensland, there appears to be scope for dealing more 
effectively with detected offences in France to increase this rate. 
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Finally, an interesting comparison point is the use of different indicators for programme 
outcomes. The Queensland example emphasizes the number of operational camera hours, the 
number of infringements per vehicles passing camera sites, crash reductions, and a stronger 
emphasis on safety-related uses of programme-generated revenue. In France, the authorities 
focus on reporting the number of installed and operated devices (fixed radars working 
permanently) and the number of infringement notices issued. Does this reflect different ways 
for operating a speed enforcement programme, or different objectives of public bodies in 
charge of their operation? There is a need for a more systematic institutional analysis to 
further evaluate and establish the relative effectiveness of different strategies. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The objective of this paper was to provide preliminary elements of comparison between the 
Queensland and French automated speed camera programmes with the view to identifying 
mutual benefits. This emphasizes the need to develop a systematic approach for comparing 
(nationally and internationally) the component parts of different speed enforcement systems 
with a view to identifying best practice initiatives.  
 
We have documented that each ASE system had its own unique history and developmental 
processes. The contingent political context appears to clearly be a crucial dimension in the 
implementation and/or expansion of these types of programmes. Public leaders have played a 
vital role in leading public debate and providing direction on topics that can be unpopular 
with their constituents. The two ASE examples presented in this paper suggest that strong 
leadership can enhance the development of these issues. As we move towards the use of 
intelligent speed adaptation devices and other technologically based countermeasures (e.g., 
point-to-point speed cameras capable of measuring average speed between multiple camera 
sites), we should not discount the role of our public leaders.  
 
Results from the review of both ASE’s demonstrate clear road safety benefits including 
reduced travel speeds, reduced total, fatal and injury crashes, and a strong general deterrent 
effect. Despite these encouraging results, one could ask: 
• Are speed cameras the most appropriate intervention to reach official objectives?  
• Are fixed speed cameras a good mechanism for increasing deterrence? 
• What specific parts of ASE programmes yield the most benefit for specific road 
environments/types of drivers? 
• Do Governments deal sufficiently well with the controversies associated with ASE’s 
including issues associated with the perceived legitimacy, credibility and 
implementation of automated enforcement? 
• Have enough efforts been made to systematically evaluate the various components of 
ASE programmes? 
 
This paper highlights the need for Governments to periodically review the design and 
effectiveness of enforcement approaches in other jurisdictions in order to identify 
opportunities for improvements in their own programmes. Additionally, there is a need for 
researchers to systematically compare the operation and effectiveness of different 
enforcement programmes to establish best practice approaches suitable for different 
traffic/road environments. A ‘whole-of-jurisdiction’ approach (“one size fits all”) to 
enforcement is not necessarily the most appropriate way to deploy scarce enforcement 
resources. There is a need to identify which parts of ASE’s are most suited to specific 
conditions within a single jurisdiction so that the most effective use of resources brings the 
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safest outcomes and the largest possible deterrent effects. This paper constitutes the first step 
in this direction and opens new perspectives for understanding the complexity of social 
systems on road safety public policy. 
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